Engineered Avian Flu Could Kill Half the World’s Humans

• Randomcheese wrote on 2011-11-30 03:22

  This isn't a movie. It's not a classic Science Fiction book. This is the real story of a scientist who created a virus with the power to litter the Earth with billions of dead bodies.
  
  OK, now breathe. Or maybe don't—the virus is airborne.
  In his Netherlands laboratory, virologist Ron Fouchier was experimenting with the avian flu virus to see how it could become even more virulent. (Red flag.) His research involved spreading it throughout a population of ferrets, and he noticed that as the virus reproduced, it adapted to spread even faster. (RED FLAG.) Not worried about ferret flu? Previous research has shown that any strains of influenza that can pass between ferrets can also pass between humans. (RED FLAAAAAAAAAG.) Ten generations later, his efforts had created an airborne strain with the power could kill half the human population. (RED ****ING FLAG, DUDE!)
  
  Fouchier, who conducted his research at Erasmus Medical Centre admitted that the new strain is "probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make." He presented his work at the influenza conference in Malta this September. Now he wants to publish his study in a scientific journal, so those responsible for responding to bioterrorism can be prepared for the worst case scenario. Seems like a no-brainer, right? Not exactly. The research has set off alarms among colleagues who are urging Fouchier not to publish, for fear the recipe could wind up in the wrong hands. Some question whether the research should have been done in the first place. Fair point!
  
  Typically H5N1 affects birds, but about 10 years ago it emerged in humans, first in Asia, then traveling around the world. Human cases are rare—about 600 total—but they are deadly, killing about half the people infected.
  
  The reason avian flu isn't more common is because it's not an airborne contagion—at least it hasn't been until now. With the un-engineered version, you have to touch something that's been contaminated to get sick. But Fouchier's version is airborne, meaning being in the vicinity of the disease and breathing it in would be enough to contract it. It's as contagious as the human seasonal flu, but much more deadly. And now Fouchier wants to publish how he made it that way.
  
  His fellow bioterrorism experts are thinking that's maybe not the best idea, because then anyone who got their hands on the paper could reproduce Fouchier's results. Microbial geneticist Paul Keim, an anthrax expert and chair of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (which will decide whether Fouchier can publish) told Science Insider:
  
  [QUOTE]I can't think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one. I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this.

  
  
  But Fouchier and a handful of other scientists who have performed similar experiments believe publishing would help the scientific community prepare for an H5N1 pandemic. Not publishing, they say, could leave researchers in the dark as to how to respond to an outbreak. But a pandemic made possible in the first place by the publication creates a bit of a chicken and egg question—and that's why the NSAB has an unenviably difficult decision to make.[/QUOTE]
  
  
  Source
  
  
  Why, just why?
• MrMs wrote on 2011-11-30 03:27
  Wait is this ****ing thing released right now?
• Cannibal wrote on 2011-11-30 03:28
  You don't read too well, do you?
• MrMs wrote on 2011-11-30 03:29
  Its to long
  
  @ i see nothing about it not being out
• Armi wrote on 2011-11-30 03:34
  [S]Seriously, keep jumping to conclusions why don't you? [/S]
  
  The benefits this has to the scientific and medical community outweigh your concerns about it being weaponized.
  
  It's not like the sequences that are expressed aren't already present in wildtype, it's just that it hasn't been found together. A vaccine can be readily prepared for if ever wildtype strains do come to express the same combination.
• MrMs wrote on 2011-11-30 03:36
  How does a deadly virus, help us at all?
• Sekwaf wrote on 2011-11-30 03:37
  It's going to be decided whether or not he should be allowed to publish his work (in a book, not introduce it to the species). On one hand, it will help cure such a thing and counteract bioterrorism. On the other hand a potential bioterrorist could create such a strain using the research.
• MrMs wrote on 2011-11-30 03:39
  I wouldn't release it at all then. The risk is kinda to big.
• Sekwaf wrote on 2011-11-30 03:39

  Quote from MrMs;676125:

  Its to long
  
  @ i see nothing about it not being out

  
  
  It's going to be decided whether or not he should be allowed to publish his work (in a book, not introduce it to the species). On one hand, it will help cure such a thing and counteract bioterrorism. On the other hand a potential bioterrorist could create such a strain using the research.
  
  Personally I think it's good that we are aware of such a thing before anybody wishing to weaponize it did. And also, this man had quite a set up I'm sure. I'm sure anybody wanting to do harm with it would have already be in the field or have some really high connection to access to the appropriate materials.
• Yoorah wrote on 2011-11-30 03:40
  People are freaking out, but really.. it's pretty similar to how security researchers (ie. computer hackers) work. This kind of dangerous work tends to get published, because the idea is that if you were able to come up with it, the bad guys may be able to do so in the future (or have already done it) as well. Getting the worldwide scientific community involved in this would make research into protection from it more efficient. And it could likely be used as a good research platform for developing defences against other types of bio weapons.
  
  The "omg don't make it in the first place" thought may make sense to the average, uneducated dude.. but it's not a very good argument if you look at the full picture.
• paladin wrote on 2011-11-30 03:40
  Its the debate
  His book is like a tool
  On the postive hand it could be used to create defenses and vaccines
  On the negative hand it could be used to weaponize and create dealdy viruses
  Either choice is moot
  release info-defenses created but so are risks
  Do not release less risk but less defense
• MrMs wrote on 2011-11-30 03:43
  Swine flu killed thousands before a vaccine was created and it was gone
  That is with the world-wide scientists working on it.
  
  
  If they have a vaccine already before they release, then idc really.
• Armi wrote on 2011-11-30 03:49
  As an added statement, unless you're mentally unstable and wish for global collapse, you wouldn't use an influenza virus, something that is uncontrollable and extremely likely to target your own population. You'd use something like Anthrax or Botulinum toxin that can be controlled and will only hit the desired target.
  
  The amount of potential terrorists that could experiment with this would lag behind the amount of researchers who could develop a vaccine for this too, so seriously your worries are unfounded.
  
  

  Quote from MrMs;676148:

  Swine flu killed thousands before a vaccine was created and it was gone
  That is with the world-wide scientists working on it.
  
  
  If they have a vaccine already before they release, then idc really.

  
  
  That's sort of the point, swine flu required cooperation and shared research between multiple researchers, it wasn't created solely by just one team. The benefit of publication is having multiple minds to do the work. Would you rather have a vaccine made in 5 months or 5 years?
  
  Edit: Next time find an article source that doesn't sensationalize, this is the sort of hysteria that isn't needed by the medical community.
• paladin wrote on 2011-11-30 03:53
  As long as that strain of the virus is killed in the lab
  I would be less worried about his methods
  Its easier to loot a lab then build a lab and create the virus from 101 no?
• Armi wrote on 2011-11-30 04:04
  I would guess they would be following BSL[bio safety level] 3 [S]or higher guidelines, most likely 4[/S] since this is after all an engineered virus; instead of the usual BSL2 guidelines for influenza A strains.
  
  Erasmus Medical Center Rotterdam, Netherlands is BSL3.